A methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus admissions increased progressively from 1993; nursing staff workload increased, areas available for (MRSA) control policy, aimed at eradication, was established at a 1000-bed hospital in 1985, applied alternative patient accomodation were reduced, the resulting ward closures interfered with clinical serconsistently for 10.5 years, and then relaxed. Its components included screening of high-risk patients, vices, and hence the control policy was relaxed in mid-1995. Isolation facilities were overwhelmed transfer of carriers to exhaust-ventilated isolation rooms, closure of wards to new admissions when with 622 new patient-isolates in the next 18 months, and there were 67 clinical infections in 1996. The local transmission was detected, MRSA screening during outbreaks, and prospective collection of proportion of blood cultures positive for MRSA rose nearly sevenfold by 1996 and 27-fold by 1997. clinical and epidemiological information. During the eradication policy period, every 6 months, a mean Thus, repeated eradication of MRSA, even epidemic strains, by use of a stringent policy, is possible given of 5.1 patients (range 1-12) already carrying MRSA were admitted, and a mean of 3.6 (range 0-16) sufficient resources, whereas flexible national guidelines designed to control, but not eradicate, epiacquired carriage in the hospital. The largest outbreak comprised 11 patients despite epidemic MRSA demic staphylococci, are currently unlikely to be successful. The costs of eradication policies need to strain EMRSA-16 being introduced six times, and MRSA did not become endemic. MRSA-positive be weighed against those of endemicity.
Introduction
In the UK, 16 epidemic methicillin resistant transmission of these strains has become endemic in many hospitals in England and Wales with numerous Staphylococcus aureus strains have been described, and currently three of these (EMRSA-3, -15 and - 16) associated clinical infections. Surprisingly, only one detailed report of the establishment of EMRSA-16 are most commonly referred to the Staphylococcus Reference Unit, Central Public Health Laboratory, endemicity at the local level has been published. 2 This involved a district general hospital where Colindale.1 Referrals of EMRSA-15 and -16 are rising progressively, and informal discussions indicate that MRSA had apparently not been encountered before;
infection control efforts were rapidly overwhelmed, from computer records of Addenbrooke's NHS Trust Finance Department. These included in-patient and and the strain become endemic at the hospital. Hence, the abilities of EMRSA-15 and -16 to compete day-case episodes (not extra-contractual referrals), and were available only by financial year. Reliable with other strains, and their impact on tertiary referral hospitals with long-term experience of MRSA control and consistent measurements of hospital inpatient workload are not available for earlier years, hence and good isolation facilities, have not been documented.
it has not been possible to calculate MRSA acquisition rates per in-patient day, admission or discharge. A standardized MRSA control policy had been established at Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge
From 1993 the GRASP System7 measure of nursing staff workload was used throughout Addenbrooke's in 1985 which was similar to, but more detailed than the UK national guidelines introduced in 1990.3 NHS Trust. This policy was strictly enforced between 1985 and mid-1995, with minimal changes. This report Bacteriological methods describes 12 years of full surveillance (a 10.5-year period before the MRSA policy was relaxed in Screening swabs for MRSA carriage taken by staff on general wards were inoculated to A of a Mannitol mid-1995, and the course of MRSA control over the next 1.5 years), plus 1 year of very limited surveilSalt Agar plate (5% sodium chloride, incubated at 37°C overnight in air), then placed in Brain Heart lance. The hospital's first EMRSA-15 outbreak is summarized to illustrate the working of the original Infusion Broth containing 5% sodium chloride and incubated for 24 h before subculture to A of a policy.
Mannitol investigated for MRSA, but this was stopped in 1990 because of the low return. From 1985, MRSA screens Infection Control Nurses visited all in-patients usually on the day they were found to be MRSAwere to be performed on all admissions to intensive care units, the Transplant Ward, and on previously positive. From 1985, infections were defined according to Centres for Disease Control criteria,4 and from MRSA-positive patients. In 1993, admission screening was introduced for all who had been in-patients mid-1993 the definitions of the UK Hospital Infection Society were used.5 Written records of cases were outside the East Anglian Region during the previous 3 months, and for those who had been in-patients kept, including standardized epidemiological and clinical information from 1989. All cases with apparat hospitals outside the UK. Whenever possible, patients were isolated in single rooms until the results ently newly-introduced strains and their early positive contacts were investigated for recent hospital admisof screens were available. Audit in mid-1995 revealed that screening was done within 24 h of sions. Whenever possible, Infection Control Teams in their hospitals of origin were also contacted to admission in about 75% cases, but that isolation was possible in only 25%, mainly because isolation enquire about local MRSA problems. Apparently newly-introduced strains were recorded as having facilities were full. Newly recruited staff were screened by the been introduced to Addenbrooke's NHS Trust if a plausible external source could be identified and if
Occupational Health Department (nose, broken skin) if they had worked on a ward in any hospital during there was no plausible local source.
Numbers of blood cultures performed per annum, an MRSA outbreak, or had worked in hospitals in London or outside the UK within the past 2 years. and numbers of S. aureus bacteraemias, were obtained from contemporary written and computer Figure 1 summarizes the procedures when a new strain of MRSA was isolated from a patient. records. Numbers of Finished Consultant Episodes,6 the standard measure of hospital in-patient workload Immediate action was taken, including isolation and attempted clearance of the index case, standardized in the UK, for the period 1992-6 were obtained repeated screening of patients on the index ward, ary cases following a single introduction was 10. restriction of movement of exposed patients and Multiple different strains of MRSA had been involved, staff, and cleaning of the ward environment. Wards including admission of six patients with EMRSA-16 were closed to new admissions if a second patient after January 1992 (spread from these occurred to in contact with the index case was found to be only eight secondary cases). Endemicity had not positive with the same strain (usually defined at this been established, and clinical infections were stage by antibiotic sensitivity pattern), indicating that uncommon (see Table 1 ). transmission had occurred on the ward. According
Most MRSA introductions and outbreaks until to this policy, the end of an outbreak was defined 1991 were associated with the Transplant Ward, as 5 or 6 negative screens over 3.5-4.5 weeks.
where bacteraemias and attributable mortality ensued among the ward's vulnerable in-patients. Thereafter the aim of the Infection Control Team at the time (Dr R.E. Warren and Mrs P. Whipp) was to maintain
Results eradication of the organism. Although disruption of
Experience before autumn 1994
clinical services occurred during ward closures, it was often possible to find alternative patient accomBefore autumn 1994, a mean of 5.1 patients per modation. For example, newly-admitted, critically-ill 6 months (range 1-12) had been admitted to patients were admitted to a spare recovery room Addenbrooke's NHS Trust with MRSA ( Figure 2) , and adjacent to the main operating theatres when an a mean of 3.6 patients (range 0-16) had acquired MRSA carriage locally. The largest number of second-MRSA outbreak occurred on the adult ICU, and they were nursed with staff who did not also work on the transferred to the surgical ward. A total of 3354 separate samples were processed during the outoriginal ICU. Agency nursing staff were usually available to support cohorting of staff and patients.
break, and 57 (1.7% of screens performed) patient and staff carriers were detected by screening. A Hence, bed closure was minimized at the expense of increased staffing costs. Until 1991-2, once MRSA detailed description of the eradication of this outbreak will be published elsewhere. transmission on a closed ward had apparently ceased, any remaining exposed patients were usually transferred en bloc to the Infectious Diseases Ward
Revised MRSA control policy until three screens over 10 days were negative.
Because the rate of ward closure in the first 6 months Latterly, other pressures on isolation beds made this of 1995 was compromising the clinical functions of impracticable, and such patients were usually the hospital, the MRSA control guidelines were cohorted with dedicated staff on their original ward. relaxed in July 1995 after discussion among the Infection Control Team, Infectious Diseases
EMRSA-15 outbreak in autumn 1994
Physicians, other clinicians and managers. More secondary cases (usually between 2 and 10) were EMRSA-15 was first isolated from an elderly patient in September 1994, and this was followed by a large allowed before wards were closed, and the variables considered are shown in Table 2 . Wards were outbreak lasting 13 weeks which involved 33 patients and 28 staff on four wards (two in the Department reopened after only two negative screens within a 7-day period. Staff screening was delayed usually of Medicine for the Elderly, one surgical and one medical). Three wards were closed to new admisuntil two or three secondary cases had been detected, although staff skin lesions were sought from the sions for a total of 17 weeks. Figure 3 shows the composite outbreak curve.
beginning. Patients with in-patient contact in any hospital within the past 3 months were screened, as Thirty-two patients received 34 courses of MRSA clearance therapy, each lasting 5 days. Sixteen of were all admitted from nursing homes. Most patients received one course of MRSA clearance therapy, but these (47%) were successful whereas seven courses failed (21%), but two of these responded to repeat this was often delayed until skin breaks had resolved and intravenous and urinary catheters had been therapy. All but two of the successful episodes were preceded by prolonged rather than transient colonremoved. Oral vancomycin was not used, but some patients and staff received additional oral rifampicin ization. Eleven courses were unassessable. Twentyfour staff were managed by the Occupational Health plus fusidic acid. The revised MRSA management guidelines Department and were successfully cleared, but only four had persistent rather than transient carriage.
reduced the rate of ward closure from one ward per 30 days for the first half of 1995, to one per 98 days Only two clinical infections were seen (infection rate 6.1% of MRSA-positive patients), and both for the second half and to one per 72 days throughout 1996. occurred in post-operative patients who had been hence place of acquisition of MRSA cannot be shown Subsequent MRSA experience in Figure 2 for 1996. Transmission was especially Rising numbers of introductions of EMRSA-15 and common on DME wards, with 132 new cases -16 were seen from autumn 1994. Table 1 shows detected in 1996 (33% of the hospital total for the the sites of clinical MRSA infections and the infection year), and 402 in 1997 (34%). Outbreaks on acute rate among patients, the numbers of staff positive wards sometimes followed transfer of patients from per year from 1989, the numbers of blood cultures DME wards to acute wards after surgical operations, performed, and methicillin-sensitive S. aureus (MSSA) as was seen in the first EMRSA-15 outbreak (Figure 3 ). and MRSA bacteraemias recorded from 1993, and Increasing numbers of previously positive patients mean utilization percentage of available nursing staff were readmitted from home and other community for the 30 wards with complete data from 1993 sources, especially elderly patients. These amounted to 1997. With the exception of 1994, utilization to between 20 and 25 per month by mid-1996. Both of available nursing staff rose progressively from strains have become endemic within Addenbrooke's 117.2% in 1993 to 125.8% in 1997. Utilizations NHS Trust. In 1996, the number of known MRSA between 90 and 100% create a quality climate, carriers in the hospital varied between 30 and 50 those between 111 and 130% indicate that staff are (3-5% total beds), and at one time in Autumn 1997 working to maximum capacity, and those above the number exceeded 90 (9%). These numbers can 130% imply that staff are having to prioritize even essential tasks.7 In 1993, seven wards had average utilization percentages above 130 for the 12-month period, and this number had risen to 12 in 1997. EMRSA-15 comprised about 60% of patient isolates during 1996, and EMRSA-16 about 30%. Because of workload pressures which reduced surveillance activities by the ICT, and because the majority of patients were affected with one or another determine the source of EMRSA-15 and -16 strains, no longer all be isolated in single rooms on many establishment of MRSA endemicity at Addenbrooke's NHS Trust and our referring units, but it cannot units within the hospital, where cohorting in bays is now performed. Alternative patient accommodation simply be assumed to be less than that of the alternative strategy in which all local hospitals strive became progressively less readily available from 1993-4. For example, in 1993 the spare theatre for eradication. We agree with Bowler9 that studies on the relative costs to society of alternative staphylorecovery room occasionally used previously as a 'clean' ICU area was converted to an extra operating coccal control policies are urgently needed, because investment, for example, in improved isolation facilittheatre plus offices. Comprehensive epidemiological and clinical data collection became unsupportable ies may be rewarding when balanced against the costs of infection. in 1997, although bacteraemias were still monitored as before, hence only bacteraemic isolates are Very few studies of long-term MRSA surveillance at the hospital level have distinguished between recorded in Table 1 for that year. We recorded 526 new MRSA-positive patients in the first half of 1997, locally-acquired cases and cases positive on admission, and those that did have usually classified and 646 in the second half. Thus, the total number of MRSA-positive patients for the 13-year period all cases detected 48 h or more after admission as nosocomial.10 In our experience, MRSA was was 2109.
first isolated from many index cases, who had undoubtedly been positive on admission, long after this time, and a number of patients were shown to Discussion have first acquired MRSA carriage or infection within a few hours of being admitted. Our allocation of Although the startling rise in the prevalence and clinical significance of MRSA described in this paper patients to 'newly admitted' or 'locally acquired' groups is unlikely to have been fully accurate, but it will be familiar to many UK Infection Control teams, the consequences of this change for individual was consistently applied and we believe it is the best that can be achieved in the context of a routine hospitals have passed largely undocumented. Staphylococcal transmission is influenced by many Infection Control service. Different components of the original strict control factors, which makes it hazardous to draw firm conclusions about causation from observed changes policy were probably important in various outbreaks, but no delay ensued while the epidemiology of each in prevalence. Similarly, well-controlled trials of the numerous possible individual interventions are virtuwas investigated and selective control procedures later applied. Others have reported successful ally impossible to perform. In Addenbrooke's NHS Trust, with an initially low prevalence of MRSA and eradication of MRSA with prompt implementation of comprehensive control measures that included isolarelatively extensive isolation facilities, a policy that gave prompt attention to all the likely modes of tion of carriers and ward closure.11 In a study similar to our own, Linnemann et al.12 demonstrated a transmission eradicated multiple introductions and small outbreaks throughout a 10-year period. Since prolonged reduction in MRSA cases hospital-wide while a stringent isolation policy was in force, and 1993, a steady rise in the number of patients already carrying MRSA when admitted enforced a relaxation a rise in prevalence after its withdrawal. Perhaps in parallel with our experience of the DME acting as of the policy, and resulted in a marked increase in the rate of nosocomial transmission and the numbers an MRSA reservoir, the outbreak described by Linnemann et al. was perpetuated by a poorlyof clinically significant MRSA infections (see Figure 2 and Table 1 ). Battles were still being won by eradicadesigned burns unit, and the prevalence fell markedly when a modern unit with better patient segregation tion of individual outbreaks even in mid-1995, but the war had been lost by the relentlessly increasing was opened.12 In contrast, others have reported reduced MRSA prevalence with emphasis being pressure of opposing numbers.
Flexible control policies are superficially less displaced only on routine barrier precautions.13,14 The significance of these studies is weakened, however, ruptive and appear less demanding of resources than are those that aim at eradication. However, the because eradication from the hospitals was not achieved, much less detail is given about screening average costs of nosocomial infections in UK hospitals are considerable8 and use of the expensive protocols, limited distinctions are made between newly-admitted and locally-acquired cases, and it is glycopeptide antibiotics vancomycin and teicoplanin within Addenbrooke's NHS Trust for prophylaxis and not possible to judge whether epidemic MRSA strains were involved. therapy is rising annually, as are the associated numbers of drug monitoring assays (data not shown).
Transmission of MRSA is now rising within many UK hospitals,1 hence isolating high-risk admissions This picture will be common to any hospital in which MRSA is prevalent. We do not have all the while screening results are obtained is increasingly demanding of Infection Control resources. Ward information necessary to calculate the cost of the closure and cohorting of staff and patients also cause considerable clinical disruption. As a result, some authors have called for all hospitals to be less 'aggressive' and adopt more 'reasonable' MRSA control measures.15,16 However, these suggestions are not based on long-term, comprehensive surveillance data with comparative costings. Revised British guidelines for MRSA control are shortly to appear17 and these will advocate a flexible response once initial efforts at eradication have failed.18 If current trends continue, we predict that hospitals who initially aim for eradication will be forced by transfer of affected patients to follow the example of their however, that eradication should be pursued for as long as is practicable, for we are not alone in documenting the rapid rise in MRSA acquisition after (14.9%) in 1996 and 74 cases (40.7%) in 1997.
Numbers of blood cultures performed rose between the capacity of a hospital's isolation facilities has been exceeded. 19 We have no evidence that the 1993 and 1997, as did hospital workload, but the proportion positive for MSSA was unchanged (0.86%) predominant route of transmission of MRSA under either policy was not, as usually reported, via the in 1993 and 1996, and fell only a little in 1997 (0.78%). In contrast, the proportion of blood cultures unwashed hands of staff.10 It is possible that the major benefits of transferring all positive patients to from which MRSA was isolated rose sharply from 0.02% to 0.56%. Patients infected with MRSA tend exhaust-ventilated isolation rooms (EVRs) on the Infectious Diseases ward may have come predomito have been in hospital for longer, to have more severe underlying disease and to have received nantly from the skilled practices of the nursing staff rather than from reduced airborne transmission. It more antibiotic therapy than those with sensitive strains,10,23,24 hence MRSA and MSSA tend to affect would be speculative to ascribe the recent rise in MRSA prevalence in Addenbrooke's Hospital to the different populations. These factors may explain our observations and those of the majority20,22,24-27 of relaxation of particular measures contained within the original policy: the increased admissions of others (but not all12) that numbers of clinical infections with MRSA rise and fall largely independently already-positive patients (see Figure 2) , rising nursing staff workload (see Table 17 ), and possibly greater of those with MSSA. Although the prevalence of MRSA bacteraemia transmissibility of epidemic MRSA strains may also have been influential. Our choice of measures in the rose steeply, the proportion of patients infected with MRSA compared with those only colonized has revised policy was aimed to reduce clinical disruption and ICT workload, while maintaining an overall ranged between 6% and 29% without showing any marked trend (Table 1) . This clinical infection rate is level of control.
Active control measures have repeatedly been lower than has generally been reported for acute hospital units, and is more in line with that associated shown to reduce MRSA colonization and infection,2,20 and Cookson17 emphasized the costwith long-term care facilities.10 This may be a result of the comprehensive, repeated screening for asympeffectiveness of the relatively aggressive measures recommended by the BSAC Working Party in 1990.3 tomatic carriers specified in our original policy, or to the involvement of many elderly patients at low Although the detection rate of new carriers with our policy was low (1.7%), others have demonstrated risk of clinical infection. Because surveillance of infections other than bacteraemia has been disconthe epidemiological value and cost effectiveness of screening contacts and high-risk admissions. 17, 21, 22 tinued, it has not been possible to gather comparable information after 1996 to investigate these hypoOur original policy, in a hospital with 15% single rooms including a specialist isolation unit, could theses further. 'Epidemic' strains of MRSA presumably have probably cope with about 30 MRSA admissions per year, plus associated re-admissions. special adaptations that fit them for dissemination within hospitals. Our original control measures had, In Addenbrooke's NHS Trust, the total burden of serious staphylococcal clinical infection increased as however, coped with six introductions of EMRSA-16 before June 1994, and the first EMRSA-15 outbreak MRSA became more prevalent. MRSA bacteraemia rose from 1-2 cases per year in 1994 and before was also successfully controlled despite large numbers of patients and staff acquiring carriage in the (0-2.4% total S. aureus bacteraemias; see Table 1 and Figure 4) , to 12 cases (12.0%) in 1995, 18 cases early stages (Figure 3 ). MRSA became endemic at Addenbrooke's NHS Trust first on the wards of the nursing utilization percentage in 1994 may well be explained by the fall in mean daily patient census DME after numbers of interhospital transfers of positive patients rose, while nursing workload increased, (see Table 1 ) which has in turn been attributed to bed closures that happened for contractual reasons. and while flexibility in patient accomodation was reduced, hence bacterial properties may not be the In addition, changes in skill mix were implemented in 1994 that increased the total numbers of staff on only explanation for apparent 'epidemic' behaviour. More research is required to investigate the adaptamost wards while reducing the proportion of trained staff. By use of the GRASP system, we are currently tions that enable EMRSA strains to be such successful nosocomial pathogens in the UK today.
analysing the effects of ward closure on nursing workload and MRSA transmission during individual Although controversial, attempts at clearing patients of MRSA carriage may be considered especioutbreaks from 1994 to 1997, and this will be the subject of a future report. ally worthwhile in hospitals with a low prevalence. 10 
